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The EU is undertaking important developments in the area of European security without 
asserting new fundamental goals. This paper proposes a conceptualisation of new logics of 
integration in the ESDP, by focusing on the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms 
in the adoption and implementation of policy provisions in the area. I argue that since 1998, 
pressing external events have led to an integrative policy change in the area of European 
security, manifest in an increasing use of expert incrementalist methods within the 
intergovernmental framework of the EU. The urgency of collective decisions adopted in 
substantive negotiations at a high political level combines with the incrementalist “filling-in” 
in the operational phase. While bargaining is highly determinant in the adoption of key 
compromises, the operational phase has become infused with administrative management and 
expert consultation, corresponding with the proliferation of newly created specialized 
agencies and think tanks, thus creating dynamics for the introduction of novel program 
specifications. Integrative outcomes are manifest in the progress in military operational 
capacity, the actual accomplishment of EU-based “Petersberg” operations, the focus on a 
more pragmatic understanding of the relationship with NATO and the proposals for 
coordination and flexibility envisaged in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty. The focus on 
conflict-resolution mechanisms provides theoretical determinants to explain integration logics 











The process of European integration is essentially a cooperative process in which 
national and European actors expect to manage the terms of their interdependence in order to 
upgrade their common interests (Haas, 1961, 1976). For many years, this integration logic 
seemed absent in the area of foreign and security policy. Policy developments have been 
immobilised by the permanent positions kept by member states of the European Union (EU). 
It can be said that the cooperative process of intergovernmental negotiations was perceived as 
not having even a common zone of possible agreements. Hence, the first fundamental of the 
integration logic, interdependence, seemed not to be perceived by states as strong enough in 
the European realm to provoke a willingness for efficient policy change, the second 
fundamental of the logic. Two sets of issues define this blockage. On the one hand, the 
functionality of an assertive European security policy was questioned because of a framing
1 
of external relations that qualified the EU as a civilian power  (see Duchêne, 1972). On the 
other hand, the suitability of an autonomous European defence and security policy seemed 
counterbalanced by the relationship of European countries with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).    
Since 1998, we observe an increase of interdependence between European actors’ 
preferences over collective security, especially between France and the United Kingdom 
(UK), leading to a revision of negotiating positions and to the tangible definition of a zone of 
possible cooperative agreements. The driving event that starts the process of launching of the 
integration project is the experience of the Wars of Kosovo
2, a more than metaphorical 
“baptism by fire” (Ginsberg, 1991). Yet, what would constitute efficient common solutions is 
                                                 
1 The concept of “framing” and “frame” are used here in a political-constructive sense, as “schemata of 
interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences…By rendering events 
and occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action” (Snow et alli, 1986: 469) 
2 The scenario for the emergence of issue on European security can be situated in the end of the Cold War 
(Wallace, 2005). The structural changes in the world order since 1989 have triggered the reconsideration of the 
strategic role of Europe in the system of Atlantic security. However, most of the debates and negotiations to 
define this new role proved to be non-starters and were clearly posited at the level of expectations (Hill, 1993). 
With the permanent divisions between member states of the EU, the European Common Foreign and Security 
Policy seemed to enlarge the gap between expectations and actual capabilities for effective action at each new 
negotiating process (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998)      3
far from definite. Paradoxically, the interlocking of the two blocking issues mentioned marks 
the emergence of new logics of European integration towards more military assertiveness and 
autonomy: recent progress in integration in the area of European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) is dependent on the resilience of the civilian conception of power and the 
reinforcement of the collaboration between EU and NATO.  
In this article, I wish to approach these developments from a theoretical perspective, 
based on the construction of a typological framework on conflict-resolution to analyse 
integrative change. My theoretical argument is that the logic of integration in the 
intergovernmental area of ESDP is based in the transformation of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, rather than in transformations of fundamental objectives. This transformation 
places an emphasis on operational phases of the decision-making process and involves the 
introduction of managerial expertise into a process that is dominated by bargaining. It implies 
a process of integration through development of practical objectives.  
  I will organize the paper in two sections. In the first section, I will first outline the 
conceptualisation of the logic of integration as a process of cooperation in which exchange of 
information leads to the introduction of ideational change that increase the value of collective 
outcomes. I will define two types of conflict-resolution mechanism distinguished by the 
different influence strategies and instruments that actors use in their interactions in order to 
reach cooperative agreements. By means of this typological framework, I will present the 
theoretical thesis positing that the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms in an 
intergovernmental decision-making process leads to policy changes based on program 
specifications, while not changing fundamental goals. I will argue that this operational change 
defines the integration progress in the area of European security.   
In the second section I will analyse the functioning of the mechanisms in the ESDP, 
drawing on case studies on the ESDP. I will concentrate on the effects of concessions and 
process coalitions in bargaining compromises and on the incrementalist program 
specifications prompted by the introduction of expertise and procedural leadership. 
 
Conceptualisation of integration as transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms.  
 
The theoretical literature on the European Union has rightly evoked the difficulty of 
explain evolutions of foreign policy with concepts from integration theory (Ginsberg, 1999 
Schmitter, 1996). Theory of integration has traditionally dedicated more attention to internal 
functional aspects of the process rather than to its  “externalisation” variable, i.e., the impact   4
of international trends and shocks that lead actors to consider the interaction of the polity with 
the international system as an integral part of the decisional process (Schmitter, 1971: 244). 
Therefore, the underlying logics of regional integration are mostly driven “from the inside”—
meaning that the basic concern is to explain how national actors progressively transfer the 
regulation of their activities into a supranational centre of decision, and how this centre 
becomes more compact and capable to provide collective efficiency (Schmitter, 2004; Lane, 
2006).   
  In my view, to understand theoretically the logics of integration in security policy 
requires adopting a perspective of cooperative change as induced by external events and 
directed towards the modification of the external context. Theory of integration will specify 
how this externally driven change is actualised through the regional decision-making process. 
In turn, the integrative character of this actualisation is to be assessed through the economics 
of  “politics of scale” –the benefits of acting jointly in the international sphere relative to the 
risks of acting alone (Ginsberg, 2001). With these economics, we have a clear logic that links 
benefits of regional cooperation with those of external reassertion.    
 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms. 
My perspective relating integration to the transformation of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms is inspired by the literature on policy change (Hall, 1993; Howlett and Ramesh 
2002). Peter Hall points out that changes in goals and instruments may involve differences in 
conceptual and practical aspects. Actors’ goals can consist of “practical objectives” requiring 
programme specifications intended to operationalise more general or open-ended goals (Hall, 
1993)
3. Howlett and Ramesh specify a typology in which policy change may be defined 
through changes of policy instruments driven by the introduction of new actors in a policy 
subsystem
4 and through programme specifications driven by the introduction of new ideas 
(cf. Howlett and Ramesh 2002: 35). 
In the model that I propose here, policy instruments are identified within mechanisms 
of conflict resolution that are employed in different phases of the decision-making process. 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms are strategic and instrumental means that actors use in their 
interactions in order to reach cooperative outcomes (see García Pérez de León, 2006). My 
                                                 
3 This emphasis on programming is a landmark of the integration theory of Ernst B. Haas, who conceived expert 
computation as a mechanism for interest-change conducted by the bureaucracy of an international organization 
(see specially, Haas 1964) 
4 A policy subsystem consists of actors from private and public organizations actively concerned with a policy 
problem or issue (Sabatier, 1998).  From the perspective adopted here, the ESDP can be defined as a subsystem.    5
conception is that mechanisms constitute the transformative variable of the integration 
process. 
The bargaining mechanism is typical of the decisional phase of the intergovernmental 
decision-making.  Actors exchange concessions and establish process coalitions as influence 
strategies to define a common position. This common position should reflect a structure of 
power. Accordingly, convergence of interests has a component of strategic utility: the 
consensual acceptance of an outcome because it is backed by sufficient power to defeat other 
possible outcomes (Coleman, 1990: 861). The integrative character of bargaining would 
depend on each state evaluating selected information obtained in the course of the 
negotiations, and subsequently revising their estimates about the salience it places on some of 
the agenda issues.  
Exchange of concessions may be integrative because of its double-binding nature that 
combines threats and promises: an actor’s threat would include the promise of acceptance of a 
solution if the demands that are the subject of the threat are considered to some extent. 
Counter-offered concessions may not entail giving in to the threatening offer, but consist of a 
compromise that was not envisaged before the interaction (see Bueno de Mesquita, 1994, 
Cross, 1978). Process coalitions have mainly a persuasive component (Dupont, 1994: 153-
155). They are aimed at demonstrating positional strength within the group and are basically 
linked with tacit threats of exclusion (Moravcsik, 1993: 500; 1998: 64-65).    
Expert-driven incrementalism is a mechanism occurring in the operational phase 
decision-making. Actors use expert information as the main resource to reach efficiency. The 
integrative character of the mechanism rests on fragmented issue-linkage.  
The theoretical argument underlying issue-linkage is simple: by adding new issues to 
the agenda, or new participants to the decision-making process, the objectives of actors are 
modified and an agreement can be found in more satisfactory terms  (see Haas, 1990, 
Tollison and Willett, 1979; Sebenius, 1983; Stein; 1980). Yet, the integration process seems 
to evidence increasingly what Ernst B. Haas termed fragmented issue-linkage: the search for 
new efficient solutions entails disaggregating policy-agendas. Following separate paths to 
solve a collective problem would provide flexible institutional designs for innovation (Haas, 
1990: 78). The question, in this respect, is whether the multiplication of specialised 
institutional bodies is conducive to integrative issue-linkage, without a specific response-
oriented behaviour from the part on actors. This non-cooperative coordination model 
corresponds to Lindblom’s  “parametric adjustment” (Lindblom, 1965: 37). The introduction 
of new actors may provide a flow of ideas and unblock the policy process by displaying   6
operational performance. Yet, the process of integration implies the construction of a 
common project that involves considerable voluntarism on the part of decisional actors. 
Integrative cooperation cannot stand without strategic guidance. Mechanisms for concerted 
action would be needed. When a minimum level of procedural guidance is established, 
expert-driven incrementalism can operate properly as a conflict-resolution mechanism based 
on strategic coordination.  
 
Model of integrative change in the ESDP.   
The logic of integration as a cooperative process involves the enlargement of the zone 
of cooperative agreements. Systemic perturbations is the first factor fostering the emergence 
of integrative change in the ESDP. Shocking external events introduce an element of urgency 
in the strategic calculations of actors participating in the intergovernmental process. By itself, 
the pressure of events creates a zone for bargaining agreements. The bargaining process 
accelerates and generates vague but important compromises. The main output of the 
decisional process change consists of the introduction of a new instrument type. This 
instrument, expert-driven incrementalism, will be employed in implementation or operational 
phases of the decision-making process. It first entails the entrance of new actors with an 
understanding of the policy problems of defence and security based on military expertise. 
Hence, in the ESDP, the bargaining mechanism does not introduce ideational change but new 
institutional actors who employ new instruments for conflict resolution.   
Ideational change involves a second policy development. The introduction of the new 
expert instrument, or rather, of the new expertise, has the effect of infusing new ideas into the 
policy process that do not conduce to fundamental change of goals but to program 
specifications. Since expert agencies have not a political role in the EU intergovernmental 
process of decision-making, their basic contribution entails practical objectives. The 
integrative change, however, is important. Program specifications will make bargaining 
compromises operational, hence leading to two basic integrative outcomes:  
 
1.  A new pragmatic relationship with NATO is corroborated, making possible the 
emergence of a genuine EU security policy.  
2.  The civilian approach to security and defence contained in the Petersberg tasks (see 
bellow, p.10) is complemented by a military component. 
   7
As the traditional substantive goals of European member states remain important, the 
development of security policies through programme specification emerges as an 
accommodation of divergences. Yet, the integrative aspect of this development is that it 
occurs within the EU institutional framework. In the process of accommodation of national 
preferences, neither EU full autonomy, nor a military intervention policy will established in 
European security affairs. However, with the maturing of urgent compromises into practical 
goals, both the relationship with NATO and the civilian conception of external power will be 
operationally directed towards more autonomy and the military capability. 
 
 
Table.1. Model of Integration process in the EDSP through conflict-resolution mechanisms 
transformation.    
     
            
Triggering             decision-making        conflict resolution                         Integrative policy change. 
 process       Phase                         mechanism                  
 
                                     
External              decisional phase          urgent bargaining                         leading to entrance of new actors                                        
shocks                                                                                                           and change in of policy instruments 
 
      
                            Operational phase.        Expert-driven                              leading to entrance of new ideas                                        
                                                                 incrementalism                             and change  in  program specifications      
 
 
Bargaining is the most important mechanism of conflict resolution in the process of 
cooperation in the ESDP. From a bargaining interaction member states of the EU configure 
the common positions and decide on joint actions for the development of the policy. These 
decisions, which take the form of compromises not overly defined, set by themselves clear 
integration paths in the course of the transformation of European security. Compromises 
through bargaining derive from changes on the perceived structure of power among states.  
The question for the integration project in defence and security is how European states are to 
change their initial positions regarding the relationship with NATO and the civilian framing 




   8
The Process of Integration in ESDP.  
 
  Since 1998, we can identify the two phases of the process of transformation of 
conflict-resolution mechanisms launching the integration security project.  
1. Decisional phase: compromises introducing new security institutions and plans for 
development of capabilities: St. Malo and Helsinki; supported by the Berlin-plus 
agreements. 
  2. The operational phase introducing the program specifications:  Operation Concordia
  and Operation Artemis. 
      
A third phase consolidates the process by defining a common set of views with the release of 
the European Security Strategy by the High Representative in 2003. The strategy is followed 
by the setting up of the 2010 Headline Goal for rapid deployment of forces to apply the whole 
spectrum of crisis management operations. This phase thus confirms a new ‘militarised’ 
framing of the European external power and guides recent developments in the integration 
process in the ESDP. 
 
The initial structure of preferences in European security.  
 
  To analyse process of cooperation leading to integrative changes, it is first necessary 
to state what where the initial position of the most consequential actors regarding the two 
issues that conform the debate on integration in European defense and security: the search for 
autonomy and the civilian status of the EU.  
The pivotal negotiation setting for these issues is the European Council, and the most 
decisive actors are the governments of the UK and France. The progress of the European 
project is structurally linked to the role of the European countries within the Atlantic 
organization. Within NATO, initial positions were divided between France, which demanded 
a more balanced relationship of Europe and Unite States within the Alliance, and the UK, 
which embraced a definite involvement of Unite States in European defence. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the recasting of a balance of influence within NATO has been hampered 
because of the impossibility of discussing the issue within the EU (Howorth, 2000: 4). In this 
period, the cooperative discussions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
of the EU were periodically unsolved because of the dominant conception of the EU as a 
civilian power and, related to this, the reliance on NATO for collective security. Thus, the   9
civilian conception involves two different implications that constitute the framing the 
integration process. First, it preserves the nation states sovereignty in matters of collective 
security and defence. Second, it makes pivotal the position of neutral and non-aligned states 
in the balance of decisional power within the EU (Shepherd, 2006). In this context, while the 
end of the Cold War reduced the sense of an engagement of the United States in European 
affairs, the Atlantic security scheme was consistent enough to serve as an umbrella to secure 
both sovereignty and neutral aspirations, and to freeze moves towards either a more solid 
Atlantist cooperation or a more military capable Europe.    
 
 
 The decisional phase: bargaining and change of instruments  
 
The St. Malo-Helsinki process: compromises.  
The initial structure of preferences was shaken under the pressure set by the “lessons 
from Kosovo”. The St. Malo meeting between France and the UK in December 1998 
launched the creation of the ESDP. The ESDP was to bestow upon the European Council the 
responsibility for framing the European security policy and to give the EU capacity for action. 
Two main issues were a subject of concern in St. Malo: the development of the EU military 
capabilities and the emerging signs that Washington was less willing to be kept involved in 
European affairs—manifested by the fights in the United States Congress over budget 
spending (see Howorth, 2000).  
The Yugoslavian War marked the process that led to St. Malo decisions. First, the 
United States adopted a more active position in favouring a greater autonomy of the European 
Union in its quest for collective security. Second, the evidence of European inoperativeness in 
Kosovo forced France to accommodate its ambitions for a genuine European Pillar within 
NATO and to opt for a new viable relationship within Europe and the United States. Third, 
the UK lifted its long-standing veto on a European security project. In procedural terms, the 
British decision is the most consequential and appears as a corollary of the US and France 
positions. In reality, the UK’s decision was motivated by the isolationist debate in the United 
States and the new rapprochement of France to NATO. For the UK, the construction of a 
European security instrument was a pragmatic solution directed at preserving NATO.    
The negotiation dynamics in St. Malo were characterised by the mixture of exchange 
of concessions and process coalitions. The exchange of concessions revealed information that 
France and the UK used to redefine their respective interests. The concession of the UK was   10
to accept the construction of the ESDP. But it contained the implicit promise of locking the 
US into the framework of European security. The configuration of UK’s position does not 
entail a change of preference towards an Europeanist view. As Howorth points out, 
“considerations geared to ensure the best interest of NATO … took precedence in Atlantist 
thinking over considerations of European Integration per se.” (Howorth, 2000: 48). Given the 
situation of strategic interdependence, the acceptance of the compromise of St. Malo appears 
to be the UK’s best alternative. Regarding France’s position, its preference was to gain 
autonomy from the Atlantic Alliance through the European common project. France had to 
concede that this promising long-term goal was only attainable through closer cooperation 
with the Alliance in the short term. 
The main issue on the European agenda of St. Malo was not collective defence but 
collective security. A scheme of collective security was established in the Amsterdam treaty 
of 1997 with the Petersberg tasks—covering humanitarian aid, rescue tasks and peacekeeping 
operations (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999). Yet, until the St. Malo-Helsinki process, the 
Petersberg tasks did not include military instruments. In this respect, the process of coalition 
building was essential in defining the terms of the framing of a military component. This 
definition depended on the alignment of the other EU member states to either the British or 
the French position. The process-coalition dynamics shifted the “range of indeterminacy” 
(Schelling, 1960) in favour of the UK position. By being firmly committed to its Atlantist 
principles, other European states aligned themselves with the UK, hence isolating France.  
However since the concession of France was motivated by its long-term willingness to 
construct the European defence and security project, its position came finally close to the UK 
proposal. The setting of an institutional framework implied the existence of a long-term 
strategic goal that could have been in opposition to the British views. However, the terms of 
the St. Malo compromises were basically pragmatic and short-term. In general, European 
countries are internally divided regarding European security matters, holding different 
positions on each separate issue that security involves (see Konich-Archibuchi, 2005). Thus, 
no side could be clearly identified in the configuration of a European common stance in St. 
Malo. Short-term compromises may indicate the relative power of the UK, the sole country 
capable of seriously sustaining plans for increasing capabilities. Yet, France held an important 
coalitional resource based on its proximity to the policy preferences of an integrationist 
Germany, which could favour the prospect of a long-term strategic objective.  
St. Malo was completed by the agreements in Helsinki March 2000, which focused 
more on operational capabilities and concrete institutional reforms. The Helsinki 2003   11
headline goal establishes rapid deployment of 60.000 combat troops within 60 days and 
sustainable for one year. It is coupled with the Berlin-plus agreement. Berlin-plus 
arrangements were defined in Washington 1999, and further detailed in the Copenhagen 
NATO Council in December 2002.  Berlin-plus regulates the EU access to NATO capabilities 
and strategic planning when NATO is not willing to act. The passing from the civilian 
conception to the European military capabilities development cannot be understood without 
the Berlin-plus framework. The closure of EU access to NATO capabilities was the principal 
obstacle for the EU to build up an operational ESDP (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003: 80). Once 
this access was confirmed, the EU declared the ESDP fully operational for the 
implementation of the Petersberg Tasks.  
The exchange of concessions in Berlin-plus revolved around the issue of allowing 
non-EU NATO members (specially Turkey) into the European security policy. While UK 
demanded this participation, France opposed it and privileged the discussions with accession 
countries. A fragile compromise was reached in the 2000 Feira European Council, setting up a 
single structure of the fifteen EU member states, complemented with regular meetings with 
the candidate countries and two meetings per-European Council Presidency with non-EU 
NATO members (see Salmon and Shepherd, 2003: 95-103).  
 
Change of instruments in the decisional phase: new actors  
The transformation of integrative conflict-resolution from bargaining to expert-driven 
incrementalism has its first key impulsion with the decision in the Amsterdam treaty of 
creating the post of a High Representative and its advisory group (Policy Unit). The position 
signifies a new instrument that provides institutional leadership for political-military planning 
and advice. Leadership is an instrument for mediation in cooperative processes (Young, 
1991). The most relevant function of institutional leadership is to provide procedural 
resources for linking heterogeneous preferences and reduce ex-ante transaction costs of 
decision-making. More concretely, the leadership of Solana proved to offer important 
“ideational resources”: the credibility in pursuing a collective goal that is not yet attainable 
(Malnes, 1995). This credibility was mostly founded in a pragmatic assessment of the 
European security project: diplomatic means had prevalence and the range of strategies for 
development of capabilities became relatively contained in definite crisis management 
operations. Arguably, pragmatic credibility turns out to be crucial in reducing the 
“capabilities-expectations gap” (Hill, 1993) that looms over European political cooperation.   12
The expert-incrementalist import in the St.Malo-Helsinki process was represented by 
the extension of institutional bodies in the decision-making process, crucially involving 
military expertise for future agenda–drafting (Duke and Vanhoonaker, 2006) and, specially, 
for the implementation of joint actions in concrete operations. The institutional framework set 
in Helsinki was intergovernmental, but it was not limited to the participation of individual 
member states. The ESDP established permanent political and military institutions both at a 
national (European Military Committee) and international basis (European Military Staff).                  
The policy decisions of Helsinki were highly demanding. Before any EU crisis 
management operation was undertaken, it was required precise definitions of types of 
capabilities required and of their actual availability in each of the European countries. For this 
assessment, the ESDP established an evaluation mechanism conducted by the European 
Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). The ECAP was a military expert group tasked to specify the 
shortfalls in capabilities (Eriksson, 2004). The ECAP produced recommendations in a 2003 
March report and the implementation of the proposed solutions were conducted by Project 
Groups treating different areas of specialisation and each of them leaded by one member state 
(Eriksson, 2004: 6). The case of the ECAP is a clear sign of the expert-driven trend that the 
cooperation in security is taking. Decisional governments were introducing a functional 
instrument to “fill in” with program specifications the common positions taken through 
bargaining. However, as differing from the delegation of functional tasks to supranational 
agencies characteristic of other areas of the EU, policy-making here is purely 
intergovernmental.  
  At the institutional level, it is unclear whether this creeping of expert bodies will foster 
turf battles with older intergovernmental institutions or integrative fragmented issue-linkage. 
In this respect, Duke and Vanhoonaker point out that informal practices produced a division 
of labour between institutional, legal and financial aspects treated by the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and substance and political analysis dealt with by the 
Political Security Committee (Duke and Vanhoovenaker, 2006: 174). Studies attest that this 
process of “socialisation” in the Brussels-based intergovernmental decision-making process is 
becoming a regular trend in the EU. It explains the frequency of consensual decisions that 
overcome the power fights paradigmatic of the bargaining mechanism (see Lewis, 1998). 
Therefore, we can expect an equal informal institutional coordination among the newly 
created strategic and military centres in the decisional phase. However, in my view, 
integration through expert-oriented incrementalism will occur mainly in the operational phase 
of the ESDP.   13
 
 
The operational phase: programme specifications 
   
Operation Concordia: implementation of Berlin-plus.  
In March 2003, the EU launched the military Operation Concordia in the Former 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In 2003 the FYROM was on the verge of a civil war 
(Piana, 2003). This urgency explains the quick consensus in the decisional phase to grant the 
operation and delegate executive powers to the HR. Employing NATO’s assets for command 
and planning, the objective was to replace the outgoing NATO Allied Harmony operation of 
peace-enforcement. Concordia is the first field application of the Berlin-plus framework. 
The pressing situation in FYROM offered a window of opportunity to construct the 
ESDP through program specifications and practical implementation. The first remarkable 
aspect of this construction was the intense cooperation between EU and NATO. NATO’s 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (DSACEUR) supplied leadership and 
operational organization while the EU focused on political and strategic guidance (Solana, 
2003).  
The second aspect is a militarization of the civilian Petersberg tasks. In normative 
terms the operation evidences how the Duchene’s essentialist conception of civilian power 
(Zielonka, 1998) is substituted by the strategic conception positing that the effectiveness of 
such civilian power depends on its being backed up by military means (Bull, 1983, Stavridis, 
2001). In terms of operability, this new strategic view of crisis management required the 
issue-linkage between the economic resources of the Community Pillar of the EU and the 
political resources of the Intergovernmental Pillar.  
In FYROM, these linkages preceded the military take-over and consisted of the 
simultaneous use of economic and political incentives. The HR applied the strategy of 
favouring the process accession of Western Balkan countries to the EU by presenting the 
Stabilisation Association Agreement (SAA). The SAA included the respect for international 
peace and stability, political dialogue with the EU, movement of workers and adaptation of 
FYROM legislation to that of the EU. Yet, the association process was linked to several 
conditions: regional cooperation, respect for fundamental rights and respect for ethnic 
minorities, institutional democracy and adoption of principles of a market economy (Piana, 
2002: 213). The HR, therefore, used policy resources that belong to the Commission. The   14
Commission, in reality, was greatly involved in the process, introducing the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism for the delivery of funds in case of emergency.  
The coordinating figure of the HR proved to be successful in translating the Berlin-
plus principles into practical goals: Solana facilitated numerous contacts with NATO and 
maximised the strategic expertise of its reduced advisory staff, the Policy Unit. In this sense, 
Concordia makes it possible to develop the EU military capabilities for crisis management by 
learning form NATO. In addition, through the linkages with the Commission, the whole 
policy process undertaken in the Balkans sets an operational precedent for what would be the 
defining traits of the “European way of war” (Everts et alli, 2004): diplomacy and 
legalisation.  
 
Artemis: the Framework Nation Concept.  
The key operational concept presented in the decision to launch the Operation Artemis 
in 2003 is the concept of Framework Nation: a member state of the EU provides the structure 
for operational guidance and exercises military leadership. This state acts in the name of the 
EU and follows a mandate from the United Nations. Artemis was a military operation led by 
France, as the framework nation, aimed at enforcing peace, and subsequently, supplying 
humanitarian assistance in the town of Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).   
The significance of Artemis had been heralded as a demonstration of the EU 
autonomous capacity for military deployment. However, various nuances would qualify this 
statement. First, the novelty of the Framework Nation raises the delicate issue of “European 
Operational Headquarters”. The UK has long opposed this sign of EU operational autonomy 
and insists that the ESDP concerns capabilities but not operations outside the Berlin-plus 
framework. In this respect, EU member states reached a bargained compromise in 2004 by 
establishing a European planning cell within NATO—the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE). In view of this compromise, the Framework Nation cannot be 
interpreted as a form of EU headquarters.    
Secondly, Artemis raises the issue of flexibility or how the ESDP may be analysed in 
the light of individual preferences of member states. In this sense, the concept of Framework 
Nation permits states to engage voluntarily in the name of the EU without the binding 
obligation of acting “as a group”. From an intergovernmental perspective, Artemis should be 
analysed in the light of the preferences of individual member states. The motives for France 
intervention are coherent with its position advocating EU autonomy in security policy. After 
Operation Concordia, France wanted to demonstrate its capacity to act autonomously, and the   15
engagement of other European nations reduced the costs of this operation (Gegout, 2005). The 
UK’s intervention was mostly symbolic, contributing engineers but not deploying troops. For 
the UK it was important to implement the commitment of St. Malo and not be excluded from 
the ESDP. After the short peace-enforcement mission, the focus remained on economic and 
humanitarian aid. This policy corresponds closely to the civilian approach in which neutral 
countries identify their preferences.       
The initial operational phase of Concordia and Artemis led to a process of learning 
through programme specifications. The basic effect was to develop internal flexibility and 
specialisation within the intergovernmental framework of the decision-making. The 
operations have developed the notion of “enhanced cooperation” within the EU in the 
practical terms of fragmented issue-linkage: some countries seem more eager to undertake 
operations requiring rapid reaction force and strategic planning, while other countries and 
institutions are more inclined to civilian tasks and economic reconstruction.  
 
The European Security Strategy.  
 
A common set of views that codifies the complement of the Petersberg tasks is 
expressed in the European Security Strategy of 2003 (Solana, 2003b). The strategy identifies 
five sets of threats: terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failures and organized crime. The strategy consolidates the precedent phase of 
successive program specifications into a new framing of European security: a more active role 
of the EU beyond civilian power and an “effective multilateralist” approach that points to the 
importance of transatlantic relations. The “European way of war” concentrates on conflict-
prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping operations, without overtly engaging in 
military intervention. Yet, the strategy indicates a clear assertion that this civilising project is 
to be backed by force.  
A new operational phase derived from the strategy is contained in the 2010 Military 
Goal, stated by the European Council in 2004. The headline goal is a move towards flexible 
cooperation and away from the initial collective Petersberg tasks. The new key concept here is 
the “Battle Group”: a model for forming military units with a rapid response capacity. The 
battle group is a concept military specific and structured according to the readiness and choice 
of member states: a state may form a unit autonomously or in association with other states in 
the manner of the “framework nation” scheme (Everts et alli, 2004: 4-6). The approach to 
crisis management becomes more direct, involving disarmaments operations and support to   16
third countries combating terrorism, as shown in the recent police mission to help the 





  The integration project of the EU in security policy can be synthesised as the search 
for autonomy in regulating collective security. The dominant conception that defined the 
quest for autonomy of the EU was that of a civilian power. As an external actor, this 
conception distinguished the EU from the Atlantic Alliance. The dramatic events of the war of 
Kosovo made clear that, in order to preserve this autonomy, it was necessary for the EU to 
bestow upon itself military capabilities; and to develop these capabilities, it was necessary to 
reach compromises with NATO and to change the conception of civilian power. 
The developments since 1998 evidence a more specialized understanding of security 
policies characteristic of practical goals. At the same time, there is not a new constituent goal 
in common security. Instead, we can understand these changes as the emergence of new 
logics of integration, which proceeds through the transformation of conflict resolution 
mechanisms: the combination of urgent bargaining with the introduction of expert-driven 
incrementalism. Presently, the institutional challenge is to enhance coordination to cope with 
the mushrooming of expert agencies. Operational developments have introduced new ideas, 
thus upgrading cooperation in European security. But it is not evident that the new scheme of 
a civilian power backed by force and of effective multilateralism represents a coherent 
integrative strategy. The proposals in the convention for the Constitution of Europe already 
suggested the need for coherence in two forms: the codification of enhanced cooperation in 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the centralising position of the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. A more integrative measure towards collective defence, the “solidarity 
clause”, is still timid in its formulation. Indeed, the opportunities to introduce program 
specifications from the putative compromise of the solidarity clause have not presented 
themselves so far. Therefore, we could not judge an integrative development here that would 
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